Gergely Pongracz was a hero of the 1956 uprising against Soviet-directed communist rule in Hungary, leading Hungarian resistance fighters against Soviet troops in a series of clashes known as the Corvin Lane or Corvin Passage battles. He has served as president of the World Federation of Hungarian Freedom Fighters of 1956. Pongracz was interviewed for COLD WAR in June 1996.

On the origins of the 1956 Hungarian uprising:

Please let me quote Lenin. Lenin said that you cannot organize, you cannot prepare a revolution: Revolution breaks out when the people awake [and] they cannot live like that anymore. ...

I was an agricultural engineer, and I saw what that [communist] system was doing -- not only with the farmers, with the peasants, but with the workers. It was a saying at that time -- it was like a joke: It's only three kind of people in Hungary: who was in jail, who is in jail, and who will be in jail -- for political reasons. So that's why the revolution came.

It wasn't the Soviet people or the Russian people we were against. We were against the system, the communist system. A lot of Russian soldiers, they were sympathizing with us during the revolution. ... In fact we had quite a few who died [fighting] on our side -- Russian soldiers. They knew what we were fighting for, and we really didn't want anything else but a free and independent Hungary. We wanted Hungary to be for the Hungarians.

On how he became involved in the fighting:

We were seven brothers and two sisters -- nine children in the family -- and I was working as an agricultural engineer far away from Budapest. And when I heard what was going on in Budapest, I knew my brothers, they're going to be involved, and I felt that my place is beside my brothers. I came to Budapest and I joined the revolution right away, because my brothers, they really were involved very deeply.

One of my brothers ... knew [the Corvin Passage] vicinity. It was in a good strategical point ... and [there] was an action over there the 24th, in the morning. A Russian armored car was destroyed, and my brother knew that the Russians were going to concentrate on this intersection. So they were looking around to find a place where it's easily defendable and we can defend it. And that was the Corvin Passage. It had another big advantage: Right behind the movie theater was a gas station, a gasoline station, so we have gasoline over there for the motors.

And when [we] broke down the lock, some people who were around over there said, "Boys, there's going to be trouble." And my brother told him, "It's coming -- the trouble is here." ... In the beginning, they were ... only 30-35 kids with guns. I wasn't there at that time, because I joined the revolution the 25th, around 3-4 o'clock in the morning.

The average age [of the fighters] didn't reach 18, [and] we had over there 12-, 13-, 14-year-old kids. Many times I sent them home, and they didn't want to leave. And you know something interesting? Some [of them] said that only because they can shoot, and only because they have a gun, that was the reason they were over there. I accepted that, until a few people ... [were] killed or wounded around them. When this happens, those 13-, 14-year-old kids are thinking that "maybe the next bullet is going to be mine." And who[ever] thinks that, they leave. Who[ever] stays, the patriotism keeps them over there, the ideals keep them over there, because they want a free Hungary. That's why they stayed with us, and it was impossible to send them home.

We had a few older fighters later on; it was maybe a dozen who were older than I was. I was 24 years old, but [in the beginning] all the rest was younger than I was. ... I was in the service before that, for two and a quarter years, [but] I didn't have any military experience except my duty years. I didn't have any political experience [either], [but] they elected me to be the commander in chief of the Corvin [group]. Now... again, [Hungarian communist leader Janos] Kadar and that regime said that the revolution was organized and prepared by the CIA, etc. Again, a revolution cannot be organized and prepared. ... And that's the other proof that it wasn't organized and prepared -- because if [it] would have been, I wouldn't be the commander in chief of the Corvin; [the commander in chief] would be a politician, a high military officer, or something like that, not an agricultural engineer [like me].

On fighting heavily armed Soviet tank troops:

I was very, very much afraid. I can talk only about myself. Quite a few times I wanted to go home. I said, "What the heck I'm doing here? Maybe the next bullet is going to be mine." And I started to go; and when I saw the 14- and 15-year-old kids dead, I said, "I was in the service for two and a quarter years; I know how to handle a gun. And I'm going home and I'm going to leave these kids to die for our country?" The shame kept me there.

I realized that only when [it] was quiet I was very much afraid. When I was involved in the fighting, I had no time to think about fear. And when I realized that, that was the reason that I was looking for the biggest fight. Not because I was a hero ... [but so I wouldn't] be afraid. And maybe that was one of the reasons I was elected to be the commander in chief.

On the end of the uprising:

The 10th of November, we gave it up. ... [The Soviets started] fighting with cannons from far away, against which we couldn't defend it. If tanks and troops are coming, we can defend the Corvin, but when from three, four kilometers are coming the [shells], we cannot defend.

When I saw that no help is coming, I said, "This is suicide, what we are doing here. It is no sense in it. We lost." And then I told the guys to go home. We lost. And I was waiting over there until everybody left. And two doctors ... who were working in the office of the Corvin headquarters and myself, four of us, all four us, we were tried. That was the end of the revolution.

The 27th of November, I left Hungary with my mother and my little sister -- she was 12 years old, and she was the only one from the family who wasn't involved in the revolution. And we arrived to Austria the 28th of November. From Austria, from Vienna, I went down to Italy with a group of freedom fighters -- I knew who they were, authentic, involved in the revolution -- and we started to organize something; maybe we still can do something. And in the middle of February, we gave up that too. Then I went back to Vienna, and from Vienna to the United States. My family was over there already.

Many [other fighters], they went to prison. About 600 of them, they were executed.

On why the uprising failed:

Later we found out we were sold out by the United States. To prove it ... the 28th of October we won the revolution. The 29th of October, the day after we won the revolution, a telegram went from the [U.S.] State Department to Moscow, to the American ambassador ... with a message [saying], "This message give to the Soviet government as soon as possible." And I [will] try to quote the telegram: "The government of the United States does not look with favor upon governments unfriendly with the Soviet Union on the borders of the Soviet Union." What was the purpose of that telegram the day after we win the revolution? To tell the Soviets that, "We don't want Hungary. Go ahead and do whatever you want to."

In the Politburo, Khrushchev said in many of his speeches that they didn't believe this telegram; they thought it's a trick from the American government. But just in case, Khrushchev said to the secretary of defense to prepare enough troops in Hungary to break down the revolution. "But don't do anything -- just go in and be there, and wait for the next order." The 2nd of November, through the CIA, the United States government knew that Khrushchev and Malenkov [were] going to be in Yugoslavia having a meeting with Tito. The second telegram, to save time, they sent to Tito because they knew Khrushchev is there. And I quote the second telegram: "The government of the United States does not look with favor upon governments unfriendly to the Soviet Union on the borders of the Soviet Union." ... The Yugoslav ambassador to the Soviet Union, he was present at that meeting ... and he says in his memoirs that Khrushchev's reaction when this was translated to him, was that, "In 24 hours we're going to write off Hungary from the map." We won the revolution and the United States government lost us, sold us out.