Khrushchev speech on the Berlin crisis

August 4, 1961

Present from the Soviet Union: Nikita S. Khrushchev, Frol Kozlov, Anastas Mikoyan, Andrei Gromyko. Non-Soviet guests: Walter Ulbricht (GDR), Todor Zhivkov (Bulgaria), Janos Kadar (Hungary), Wladyslaw Gomulka (Poland), Antonin Novotny (Czechoslovakia) Georgi Georgu-Dej (Romania).

Excerpts from Khrushchev's comments:

"Our delegation agrees completely with what Comrade Ulbricht has reported. ... We must wring this peace treaty ... They [the Western powers] had hauled Germany into the Western bloc, and Germany became split into two parts. The peace treaty will give legitimacy to this split. ... It will weaken the West and, of course, the West will not agree with it. Their eviction from West Berlin will mean closing of the channels for their subversive activities against us.

"... I believe there are people in our countries who might argue: Was it worth a cost to push this issue and let the heat and international tension rise. ... We have to explain to them that we have to wring this peace treaty, there is no other way. ... Every action produces counteraction, hence they resist fiercely. ..."

[There was always an understanding, Khrushchev continued, that the West] "would intimidate us, call out all spirits against us to test our courage, our acumen and our will."

"As for me and my colleagues in the state and party leadership, we think that the adversary proved to be less staunch that we had estimated. ... We expected there would be more blustering and ... so far the worst spurt of intimidation was in the Kennedy speech [on July 25, 1961]. ... Kennedy spoke [to frighten us] and then got scared himself.

"Immediately after Kennedy delivered his speech I spoke with [U.S. envoy John J. McCloy]. We had a long conversation, talking about disarmament instead of talking, as we needed to, about Germany and conclusion of a peace treaty on West Berlin. So I suggested, come to my place [Black Sea resort in Pitsunda] tomorrow and we will continue our conversation.

"On the first day [in Pitsunda] before talking we followed a Roman rite by taking a swim in a pool. We got our picture taken, embraced together. ... I have no idea whom he is going to show this picture to, but I don't care to appear in one picture with a Wall Street representative in the Soviet pool.

"I said [to McCloy]: 'I don't understand what sort of disarmament we can talk about, when Kennedy in his speech declared war on us and set down his conditions. What can I say? Please tell your president that we accept his ultimatum and his terms and will respond in kind.'

"He then said ... [that] Kennedy did not mean it, he meant to negotiate. I responded: 'Mr. McCloy, but you said you did not read Kennedy's speech?' He faltered, for clearly he knew about the content of the speech.

"'You want to frighten us,' I went on [to McCloy]. 'You convinced yourself that Khrushchev will never go to war ... so you scare us [expecting] us to retreat. True, we will not declare war, but we will not withdraw either, if you push it on us. We will respond to your war in kind.'

"I told him to let Kennedy know ... that if he starts a war then he would probably become the last president of the United States of America. I know he reported it accurately. In America they are showing off vehemently, but yet people close to Kennedy are beginning to pour cold water like a fire brigade.

"We already passed that age, we wear long trousers, not short ones. I told [Italian Premier Amintore] Fanfani yesterday: '...I don't believe, though, there will be war. What am I counting on? I believe in your [Western leaders'] common sense. Do you know who will argue most against war? [West German Chancellor Conrad] Adenauer. [Because, if the war starts] there will not be a single stone left in place in Germany. ...'"

[War between the U.S.S.R. and the United States, Khrushchev allegedly told Fanfani, is] "hardly possible, because it would be a duel of ballistic intercontinental missiles. We are strong on that. ... America would be at a disadvantage to start a war with this weapon. ... They know it and admit it. ... America can unleash a war from its military bases they have on [Italian] territory. Consequently we consider you as our hostages."

[British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan visited Moscow in 1959 and told Khrushchev that war was impossible. Khrushchev presumes that Western leaders continue to act on that conviction.] "Macmillan could not have lost his mind since then. He considered war impossible then and, suddenly, now he changes his mind? No, no. The outcome of modern war will be decided by atomic weapons. Does it make sense if there is one more division or less? If the entire French army cannot cope with the Algerians, armed with knives, then how do they expect to scare us with a division? It is ludicrous, not frightening. [De Gaulle admitted to our ambassador a couple of weeks ago, Khrushchev says, that he did not want the reunification of Germany.] He pays lip service to it [reunification] because it is in Adenauer's interests. Nobody wants reunification of Germany --neither France, nor England, nor Italy, nor America.

[If Western powers refuse to sign a treaty with the GDR, then, as Khrushchev said to McCloy:] "'You will have no access [to West Berlin]. If you fly and violate [the aerial space over the GDR], we will down your planes, you must know it.'

"Why we were so blunt? Comrades, we have to demonstrate to them our will and decisiveness. ...

"Hence anything is possible in the United States. War is also possible. They can unleash it. There are more stable situations in England, France, Italy, Germany. I would even say that, when our 'friend' [John Foster] Dulles was alive, they had more stability [in the United States]. I told McCloy about it."

[Dulles was the one who] "resolved to bring us down to submission, but he was afraid of war. He would reach the brink, as he put it himself, but he would never leap over the brink, and [nevertheless] retained his credibility.

"On our side, we have already mapped out some measures. And we are considering more in the future, but short of provocations. I told McCloy that if they deploy one division in Germany, we will respond with two divisions, if they declare mobilization, we will do the same. If they mobilize such and such numbers, we will put out 150-200 divisions, as many as necessary. We are considering now ... to deploy tanks defensively along the entire border [between the GDR and the FRG]. In short, we have to seal every weak spot they might look for."

[Khrushchev doubted that Western powers would risk forcing their way to West Berlin, because it would surely mean war. But he said that chances of economic blockade of the GDR and, perhaps, of the entire Eastern bloc were "50-50." That led him to comment ruefully on the dependence of socialist economies on Western trade and loans:]

"We have to help the GDR out. ... Everybody is guilty, and the GDR too. We let down our guards somewhat. Sixteen years passed and we did not alleviate pressures on the GDR. ..."

[He conceded that the GDR, if not helped, will collapse.] "What will it mean, if the GDR is liquidated? It will mean that the Bundeswehr will move to the Polish border ... to the borders with Czechoslovakia ... closer to our Soviet border."

[He then addressed another point of criticism, why it was necessary to help the GDR raise its living standard, already the highest among the countries in the Eastern bloc:]

"If we level it [the GDR's living standard] down to our own, consequently, the government and the party of the GDR will fall down tumbling, consequently Adenauer will step in. ... Even if the GDR remains closed, one cannot rely on that and [let living standards decline].

"I wish we could lick the imperialism! You can imagine what satisfaction we'll get when we sign the peace treaty. Of course we're running a risk. But it is indispensable. Lenin took such a risk when he said in 1917 that there was such a party that could seize power. Everybody just smirked and snorted then. ... World public opinion now is on our side not only in the neutral countries, but in America and in England.

"Summing up, our Central Committee and government believe that now preparations are proceeding better, but there will be a thaw, and, more importantly, a cooling down. ... We have to work out our tactics now and perhaps it is already the right time."