Cuban President Fidel Castro is approaching the 40th anniversary of the Cuban Revolution. He was interviewed for COLD WAR in March 1998. This interview has been translated from Spanish.

On Cuba and the Cold War:

We were not the ones who got involved in the Cold War, but rather it was the Cold War which introduced itself into the Cuban Revolution. The Cold War was brought in by the United States government. And at the time of the triumph of the revolution, we had no relations with the Soviet Union. There was no Soviet ambassador here, we had no trade with the Soviet Union -- though we did feel that our country should trade with every country in the world; we felt that our country should have access to all the markets. But we had no relationship whatsoever with the Soviet Union, nor did the Soviet Union have anything whatsoever to do with our revolution. ...

The [land reform] act was passed in the month of May, and that was the moment when all the [U.S.] plans against Cuba began. So we were led into the Cold War, because we couldn't buy weapons in another country, nor could we sell our sugar, since [the U.S. and its allies] began to limit our quotas, and there was no way for us to purchase many things. It was then that we decided to turn to the socialist countries for weapons, and that's how the first socialist-bloc weapons arrived in Cuba. ... We needed to arm the people in order to defend the revolution. This is how we found ourselves involved in what later became known as the Cold War; but it can be said that we did as much as we could to avoid getting involved in [it].

On the Bay of Pigs:

The Bay of Pigs invasion, in April 1961 ... was soundly defeated in less than 72 hours. It lasted some 60-odd hours. It could have been over in 30 hours, but I would have to explain things that I wouldn't want to get involved in now. The U.S. government certainly did not accept the idea of that defeat. The fact is that Kennedy did not bear the main responsibility for that invasion, since it was a legacy from the previous administration. I mean, the programs, the plans, all that had been orchestrated before Kennedy became president of the United States in 1961, but he had to endure that defeat. He was courageous in dealing with that defeat; he was honest and he was courageous when he said that victory has many parents, but defeats are fatherless. He took the full responsibility, but he was not able to come to terms with those results, so immediately afterwards plans of a different nature began to be hatched in order to destroy the [Cuban] revolution -- plans which included the use of the U.S. armed forces. We suspected that that might happen, so we continued to prepare ourselves, and with the experience that we had gained during our own war, we prepared to face an invasion with all the means we knew the United States had at their disposal. We conceived a special kind of war in order to face up to that.

On why he approved the secret shipment of Soviet missiles to Cuba:

At the beginning of 1962 -- I don't remember the precise date -- there was a meeting between Kennedy and Khrushchev in Vienna. From those talks, Nikita concluded that the Americans had plans or intentions of carrying out an attack against Cuba. ...

The Soviets reported that to us. Of course, by then we were also very suspicious with regard to the United States, because we had already been through many experiences -- not only the Bay of Pigs, but the dirty war: dozens upon dozens of armed landings, or dropping weapons with parachutes, most of which we managed to seize. They carried out a dirty war against our country. Irregular [counterrevolutionary] warfare groups were active in every province, even in Havana, but we confronted them with the armed people; we took the fighting seriously, and we managed to neutralize it. ... We had suffered instances of sabotage, pirate attacks, and aggressions of all sorts, and we were not only irritated but also very suspicious of the United States. So we were not at all surprised by the information we received from the Soviets, but neither were we alarmed or worried, because we felt that we were capable of resisting an aggression. We could have become the first Vietnam, before Vietnam itself, [because] we knew our territory and our mountains very well; we had fought in very difficult conditions, and we enjoyed support in the mountains, in the countryside, in the cities, everywhere; the people supported us and were willing to fight. And it has been historically proved that when the people are willing to fight, it is impossible to defeat them. ...

On May 29, 1962 ... two emissaries arrived from Khrushchev to Havana. One of them was Rashidov, who was then the first secretary of the Communist Party in Uzbekistan (a country which is nowadays voting against Cuba in the United Nations, making up three votes in favor of the blockade). So Rashidov arrived in Cuba, as well as the head of the Soviet troops, Marshal Biryusov. They had a meeting with me, and they explained to me about their concerns regarding a possible U.S. aggression against Cuba.

It was a brief interview, and they asked me what I felt about it, and what could be done to prevent such an invasion. At that time I was not thinking about any missiles, but I said to them, "Look, the only way to prevent a direct U.S. aggression is for the United States to realize that an invasion against Cuba would be tantamount to a war against the Soviet Union." That's the same thing as the United States has done in other countries, to which they have given guarantees and said, "This country cannot be touched; and if it is, we will take it as an aggression against the United States." That's a principle the United States has applied in the case of many countries in the world. I thought that a clear and categorical Soviet statement could be influential enough and exert enough pressure to prevent a direct invasion by the United States.

It was then that they asked me another question: "Yes, but what to do? How can it be demonstrated that an invasion of Cuba would mean a war against the Soviet Union?" And it was then that they raised the possibility of the medium-range missiles, installing 42 of those missiles in our country, and also sending a certain number of forces: anti-aircraft rockets, air and ground forces, and a number of Soviet mechanized regiments.

I immediately grasped the situation; I realized right away that there were two concerns here. On the one hand, a real concern that there might be an aggression against Cuba, a country to which [the Soviets] felt morally committed from the moment we purchased weapons from them and they began purchasing our sugar, supplying us with fuel, and they supported us at the United Nations and made very strong statements about the Bay of Pigs invasion; and there was also great sympathy and admiration among the Soviet people for the people of Cuba, because it was a revolution that had emerged by itself, a spontaneous revolution at the gates of the United States, which was something they had never believed could happen. ... But at the same time, I grasped right away that there was also a strategic interest on their part. I could see the strategic importance of the presence of those missiles in Cuba. By that time, the Americans had already secretly transported similar missiles to Turkey and to Italy, which were not very far from the Soviet territory. The transport of missiles to Turkey was kept as secret as the dispatch of Soviet missiles to Cuba.

So I was faced with a dilemma: I didn't very much like the idea of having Soviet missiles in our country, or Soviet troops on our territory, because of how it would affect the image of the Cuban Revolution, and because by that time, given the experience we had gained, we were already thinking in terms of a revolution in the rest of Latin America. ... We had already arrived at the conclusion that no profound changes were possible in Latin America without a revolution similar to the one we had made in our country ... and we gave a great deal of importance to the revolution in Latin America. So of course, to appear to be a Soviet base here in the Caribbean would lose the Cuban Revolution a great deal of influence and prestige, and the world would perceive us to be a Soviet base. ...

But then we looked at the issue from a different, very important angle. I would say that it was an ethical question. I thought: If we expected the Soviets to fight on our behalf, to run risks for us, and even to involve themselves in a war for our sake, it would be immoral and cowardly on our part to refuse to accept the presence of those missiles here, which would improve the balance of power in favor of the Soviets and the socialist camp, as well as the strategic position of the Soviet Union. We felt that we were faced with an ethical question, and I'm telling it to you exactly the way I thought about it then, when they put forward the request.

But of course, I couldn't give them a reply there and then. Nevertheless, I had come to the conclusion that it was our duty to accept the risk entailed by the missiles. We were not unduly worried about the physical danger, or about the eruption of a possible crisis. [The missiles] might protect us from an invasion with conventional weapons, but we felt capable of fighting against an aggression of that nature. What remained was the question of our image in Latin America, how we would be perceived in Latin America, which was our concern and the concern we had about the revolution in Latin America. So I said to the Soviets, "Look, I can't give you answer. I need to consult with my comrades in the government and in the party, because it's such an important issue." But when I rose from the table, I was convinced that, morally speaking, there was no alternative but to accept the presence of those missiles. ...

There is no doubt in my mind that the presence of those missiles in the vicinity of the United States meant an improvement in the balance of power, an improvement in [the Soviet] strategic position, regardless of the number of missiles they had, because the warning systems were faster. The strategic intercontinental systems took longer: 30-35 minutes, whereas the missiles here, like the ones the Americans had in Turkey, had much quicker warning systems, between eight and 12 minutes, and everyone could understand that from the military point of view this meant an improvement in their strategic position.

On whether the missiles were operational during the crisis:

That's an issue which is still under discussion, but according to what I was told at the meeting on the 27th or 26th of October [1962] with the Soviet military command, when they informed me about the state of the forces, [the commander] told me, "The air regiment is ready, the surface-to-air missiles are ready, the tactical nuclear missile unit is ready." I don't remember the names he gave the equipment or the regiment, [but] "The missile unit is ready," he said. That was the report he gave me on 26th October 1962.

On a letter he wrote to Khrushchev apparently urging a preemptive nuclear strike:

[That] has not been correctly explained. That letter you mentioned does exist; it has been published. ... It is the most tremendous letter in history. ...

During all the months that preceded the crisis, the Soviets adopted a different approach from ours; we had been in favor, from the very beginning, of making public the military agreement between the Soviet Union and Cuba -- but they didn't publish it. From our point of view, what we were doing was absolutely proper both legally and morally speaking. No objections could be made to what we were doing, and it was in full accordance with the principles of international law. I mean, we were doing exactly the same thing as the United States used to do, and still does, everywhere else, in Asia, Japan, Spain, Great Britain, in all the countries where the United States had, or has, military bases, troops, missiles and strategic bombers. So I said [that accepting Soviet missiles] was absolutely legal, and that we should make public what we were doing and publish this document.

But it was not known that there was a military pact between the Soviet Union and Cuba. My point of view was that we should do this openly, and not as if it were something illegal to be done secretly. We needed to have all the moral strength of someone who is acting within the international law. I have mentioned this just as an example of the extremely poor way in which Khrushchev handled the period prior to the crisis, and the crisis itself -- and I'm saying this as someone who is grateful to Khrushchev and who remembers him with sympathy and affection for all the things he did for us. ... But they made many mistakes, military mistakes and mistakes of all kinds. ...

I felt that the situation was really difficult, because Kennedy took very good advantage of Khrushchev's errors, and one of his mistakes was to become involved in the game of discussing whether those were offensive or defensive weapons. Well, a pistol can be offensive if I bring it here to shoot you with. What is offensive and defensive in terms of weapons? Actually, when they talked about offensive or non-offensive weapons, they meant strategic weapons. When Kennedy spoke about that, he had in mind strategic weapons, and when Khrushchev spoke about it, he had in mind whether the objectives of the weapons were offensive or defensive. These were the two different views of those two people. [Soviet] Ambassador Dobrynin spoke several times with Kennedy and the people who were closest to him, and he assured them that there were no offensive weapons. In fact, deceit was used by the Soviets; and in any political feud or any kind of feud, deceit is wrong, deceit is fruitless, and it demoralizes both the man who deceives and the man who is being deceived. And the worst of it is that Kennedy fully believed what Khrushchev had been telling him.

At the same time, we were arguing, in all our statements, at the United Nations and everywhere else, that we had no obligation to account for the types of arms we had. We affirmed our right to use whatever weapons were appropriate and necessary for the defense of our country, without the need to tell anyone what kind of weapons they were. That was our position throughout; we never took part in the game of talking about offensive or non-offensive weapons, as Khrushchev did.

I was really afraid that he might make a mistake. I saw that the situation was really difficult; there was no elegant way out for Kennedy in that situation, and a war appeared imminent, or at least a first strike might take place at any time. That's how we felt. At that moment, I didn't think about Cuba. I said to myself: if such an unfortunate war is unleashed, we will disappear from the map. At that moment I was worried about the rest of the world, about the Soviet Union, about humanity at large. I wasn't so concerned about Cuba. I was worried that a mistake might be made and the Soviet Union might be hit by a first surprise strike.

And that's when I made the decision to write that letter on this very sensitive subject, because I had to address Khrushchev, the "owner" of those missiles. I would be addressing the superpower, the country that had played such an important role in the world war, a country with an outstanding role in the international arena, and I decided to write that letter. Since I knew that we would be discussing this subject, I've brought some materials with me. This letter is dated October 26, 1962. It was at night, and I was at the Soviet Embassy in Havana. I drafted it myself, using a pencil, as quickly as I could, and I crossed things out and rewrote them, and I dictated it to the [Soviet] ambassador on the night of the 26th. We had instructed our anti-aircraft troops to fire at the low-flying planes the following day, on the 27th, and we had informed the Soviets about it. So, in the letter I talk to Khrushchev about the situation; I explain to him that an attack will take place, because in fact we were almost at war since we were going to stop the low flights, and our anti-aircraft artillery would start shooting at the American planes on the morning of the 27th (we didn't handle the missiles, but our own weapons were sufficient to shoot down those low-flying planes). As we felt that the low flights could no longer be tolerated, the battle would be starting the following morning. But not with nuclear weapons; this would be a combat against the low flights using our own anti-aircraft weapons, based on our idea that the situation could worsen and there might be an attack against those missile bases within 24 and 72 hours. We had been reading all the press dispatches and all the discussions, and we concluded that an air strike against those missiles was imminent.

So I told Khrushchev, on the basis of the analysis of the situation and the reports we had, that I felt an aggression was imminent, within the next 24 to 72 hours. ... I said that there were two possible variants. The first, and most likely one, was an air strike against certain targets, with the limited objective of destroying them; so I had recommended to the Soviet high command to separate off some missiles, not to keep all of them in the launching ramps. The second, less probable, although possible variant, was invasion. I understood that this variant would call for a large number of forces, and being the most repulsive form of aggression, it might inhibit them. ... Anyway, I said that if the second variant took place and the imperialists -- this was a very common word at that time -- invaded Cuba with the aim of occupying it, the Soviet Union must never allow a situation to develop in which the imperialists would launch the first nuclear strike. This was literally what I said, because I was absolutely convinced that if they invaded our country, this would create the grave risk for the Soviet Union of the U.S. taking the second step of carrying out a nuclear air strike against the Soviet Union. That's why I raised this question with Khrushchev as delicately as I could, saying that the Soviet Union must never allow a situation to develop in which the imperialists could launch the first nuclear strike -- because I was sure that after [an invasion], the second step would be for the Americans to launch a first nuclear strike against the Soviet Union.

I dictated this letter to the [Soviet] ambassador. I wrote the letter on the basis of the notes that I had, and the ambassador did not even speak good Spanish, and we had no interpreters. Who knows what the ambassador actually sent over there, but apparently he did convey something of this idea, perhaps not very clearly. ...

Later, on 30th October, [Khrushchev] wrote to me trying to square accounts with me for my letter of the 27th. It's three pages long, but I will read you only one paragraph. It says: "In your cable of 27th October, you proposed that we should be the first ones to deal a nuclear strike against enemy territory. You realize, of course, where this would lead. This would not be a simple strike, but rather the start of a thermonuclear world war. Dear Comrade Fidel Castro, I consider this proposal of yours incorrect, although I understand your motivation." Before that, we had been discussing some other things, different subjects. I spoke about the decision he had made about us without consulting us. But then he mentioned my message, the way he interpreted my message. Who can we blame -- the ambassador for his translation? The little Spanish the ambassador knew? But in substance, he was making reference to a message in which I was actually telling him that in the event of an invasion, he should not give the enemy the possibility of dealing a first nuclear strike against his country. I was advising him. And of course, I took it for granted that by that time [Cuba] would have disappeared from planet Earth. ...

Perhaps you can understand it better if I read some paragraphs of this letter I wrote to him on 31st October, clarifying some things. I say here: ... "I did not suggest to you, Comrade Khrushchev, that the U.S.S.R. should be the aggressor, because that would be more than incorrect: It would be immoral and contemptible on my part to do so. But from the moment the imperialists attacked Cuba, and while there were Soviet armed forces stationed in Cuba to help in our defense in case of an attack from abroad, the imperialists would, by this act alone, become aggressors against Cuba and against the Soviet Union, that we would respond with a strike that would annihilate them. I did not suggest to you, Comrade Khrushchev, that in the midst of this crisis, the Soviet Union should attack, which is what your letter seems to say. Rather, that following an imperialist attack" -- not an air strike, I mean here the invasion of Cuba -- "that following an imperialist attack, the U.S.S.R. should act without hesitation and should never make the mistake of allowing a situation to develop in which the enemy could launch the first nuclear strike against it. And in that sense, Comrade Khrushchev, I stick to my point of view ... because I understand it to be a true and just assessment of a specific situation. You may be able to persuade me that I am wrong, but you cannot tell me that I am wrong without convincing me. Furthermore, I did not speak as a troublemaker, but as a combatant from the most endangered trench." ...

I had explained to him that we were aware that if an invasion took place, a war would break out, and that we had resigned ourselves to the idea that we would be annihilated. But as a friend, we said, "Look, if that happens, if we are annihilated, OK, we are willing to take the risk; but you should act accordingly and not fall into the additional mistake of allowing a first nuclear strike." And today I am sure that following an invasion, a nuclear strike would have occurred. The United States never gave up the idea of being the first one to deal the nuclear strike, and that theory was maintained throughout all the years of the Cold War, and this is still their theory.

On learning about Khrushchev's deal with Kennedy to end the crisis:

[Khrushchev] sent me [a message] on the 28th in the morning, and he told me that the message he had sent to Kennedy allowed him to resolve the situation in favor of Cuba and to protect Cuba from an invasion. I explained to him that we had made a five-point statement which we felt was indispensable to an honorable solution. In those five points, we included the cessation of the embargo, the return of the territory of the Guantanamo naval base, the cessation of the dirty war and the pirate attacks. These are five correct and perfectly acceptable points. Since the Soviets had decided to withdraw the missiles, they could at least have demanded that the Americans accepted these five points. ...

[But] Khrushchev sent [a] message saying that if he were to be given guarantees that Cuba would not be invaded -- not even a written guarantee, but a verbal one -- then the missiles would be withdrawn. We were irate. How did we learn about this? Through the radio, on the morning of the 28th. The radio broadcast that an agreement had been reached between the Soviet Union and the United States, and that Kennedy was offering Khrushchev a guarantee. It really was a disgraceful agreement. I think that since Khrushchev was willing to withdraw the missiles, he could have reached a more honorable settlement. It would have sufficed with "satisfactory" guarantees for Cuba.

One word would have done it: "satisfactory" guarantees for Cuba. If that had been included in the message, no one would have started a nuclear war for the sake of a naval base or a blockade, and if he was willing to withdraw the missiles in exchange for guarantees, he could have asked for satisfactory guarantees for Cuba. ...

And it would have been an honorable solution for Kennedy and even for the Soviet Union. And it would still have been a victory for Kennedy because the missiles would be withdrawn and there would be no war. But it would have been more elegant, more honorable for the Soviet Union vis-a-vis the people of Cuba.