As commander of U.S. forces in Vietnam from 1964 to 1968, Gen. William Westmoreland oversaw the introduction of ground troops in Vietnam in 1965 and the subsequent buildup of U.S. forces there. He was a key architect of the U.S. military strategy and a consistent advocate for a greater commitment from Washington. In 1968, after asking for more ground troops in response to the Tet Offensive, President Johnson recalled him to Washington to become U.S. Army chief of staff. After support for the war collapsed in Washington, he retired in 1972. He was interviewed for the COLD WAR series in June 1996.

On the introduction of U.S. ground troops in Vietnam in 1965:

The United States moved into Saigon as the French were moving out. And frankly, I don't believe there was a great appreciation in our country that resulted in a commitment. It was going to be quite costly. ...

At the time, things were quite quiet. We had advisers [in South Vietnam] -- we had in fact replaced the French in that regard -- and we had advisers down to battalion level within the Vietnamese military structure. The problem at that time was not an invasion of the area by the North Vietnamese, but it was the erosion of the effectiveness of government brought about by the so-called "VC" -- the Viet Cong. It was not open warfare, but, as we referred to it at the time, insurgency. And we were involved in the counter-insurgency operations.

The political structure of South Vietnam was rather shaky at the time, because nobody knew from day to day who was running the country. ... Our mission at that time was to try to bolster the Vietnamese government, the morale of which was in disarray. We were dealing in a geographical area where we'd had very little experience in the past. We were dealing with a political-military situation. It was really quite complex. So what I'm really saying is, as we moved in to help the Vietnamese defend their country and confront the Viet Cong (the Vietnamese communists, controlled from Hanoi), we were in the process of getting acquainted with the terrain, the Vietnamese political apparatus and the Vietnamese army. And it was quite an interesting but challenging time. ...

I would say the main problem was [with] the Vietnamese society. It didn't seem to be a cohesive operation. There were factions that were fighting within the South Vietnamese society. ... And it became very clear that Hanoi was in effect strategically running the [Viet Cong] operation. ... This was a type of war that we'd had no experience with before and we were on the learning curve. And some of our policies were kind of trial and error in character. So, I suppose to sum up what I've said, we members of the United States military moved into an arena that was foreign to us, not only with respect to nationality and language, but the type of challenge that we met.

On fighting a limited war:

Well, that was a major problem. At the outset, the president made the statement that he would not geographically broaden the war, and that meant that military actions were confined to the territory of South Vietnam. The enemy was not operating under such restraints, and therefore over the years the border area of Cambodia and Laos were used freely by the enemy. But by virtue of the policy of my government, we could not fight the overt war or deploy military troops overtly into those countries. And that was a major problem. A major problem. That gave the enemy a sanctuary that was of benefit to him. I mean, when he moved into the South Vietnamese soil, he was defeated, he took great casualties; but then he moved across into Cambodia or to Laos, licked his wounds, and restored his military capability. And that is why the war lasted so long. It was a frustrating experience for us. ...

We were winning on the battlefield, but whether we were winning strategically is another matter. But the strategy came from Hanoi and there was little that we could do about it. And the people in Washington -- the Secretary of Defense and [the people in] the White House -- understood [that] from a military standpoint, [our policies involved] a restraint that was inevitably going to prolong the war. I mean, I think this was well-understood, but nevertheless, it was [our] policy, based on the fact that we were not the aggressors. We were not going to be party to enlarging the war.

On the Tet Offensive:

We saw the Tet Offensive coming and we were prepared for it. And the enemy took tremendous casualties there; and we felt that the magnitude of those casualties would result in the enemy coming up with some sort of diplomatic solution. But that never took place. ...

The American public were caught by surprise. We were making military progress at the time -- which [is] a statement of fact. And when the Tet Offensive took place, the American people were not prepared for that, and I assume some significant responsibility for that. and I've made this statement many times. If I would have to do it over again, I would have made known the forthcoming Tet Offensive. At that time, I didn't want the enemy to know that I knew what was going to happen. I did know. I made a mistake in not making that known to the American public, because they were caught by surprise and that was a very much of a negative factor.

On the impact of television journalism on the war:

Well, it's the first war that we've ever fought on the television screen and it was the first war that our country ever fought where the media had full reign, [where] they had no restraint. We provided no restraint over the media. I mean, that was a policy by the president, and the enemy exploited it. It was something that plagued me from the very beginning. On the other hand, when I knew the Tet Offensive was coming, I should have made a public statement and maybe gone in front of the TV cameras and made known to the American people that a major offensive action was to take place. I didn't do that because I didn't want the enemy to know that I had access to his plans. ... And in retrospect -- and I've made this statement many times -- that was bad judgment on my part.

On the war in general:

We were succeeding. I mean, when you looked at specifics, this became a war of attrition, [and] we were winning the war of attrition. The price that the enemy was prone to pay greatly exceeded our expectations. ...

I think one has to understand what our objective was. The objective in Washington was to raise the cost of the war from the standpoint of the enemy, to the point that he would come to some negotiated settlement. The attitude of the enemy was not comparable to what our attitude would have been under the circumstances. He was ready, willing and able to pay a far greater price than I would say we Caucasians would. ...

I wouldn't say that such a war was necessary, but it took place. And I'm reminded of Mr. Kennedy's inaugural address: "We'll pay any price, bear any burden, support any friend, oppose any foe for the survival and success of liberty." That was ... in Kennedy's inaugural address when he became president. And that being policy, when the situation presented itself in Washington that had prevailed in Southeast Asia, those words came back to us.