Anatoly Dobrynin was appointed Soviet ambassador to the United States by Nikita Khrushchev in March 1962. He served in that position during the administrations of U.S. presidents Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, Ford, Carter and Reagan. In 1986 he was called back to Moscow to serve as head of the international department of the Communist Party's Secretariat, and in 1988, he retired. This interview, which has been translated from Russian, was conducted for the COLD WAR series in March 1997.

On Cold War nuclear strategy:

[U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert] McNamara was one of the main initiators of nuclear doctrines -- the doctrine of mass destruction, then of limited strike, then a counter-force strike. And they ended up with MAD, the "mutual assured destruction" doctrine. In English it sounds very good: "MAD," which means crazy. That was real madness, when both sides came so close to killing each other.

Initially, the Americans had the advantage of [being] the first to have made the bomb. And they had means of delivery, they had long-range bombers, and the theory of "massive retaliation" was their doctrine. The Americans liked to put very bright labels on their doctrines. We were much simpler: war is war, killing is killing. They had an impressive name for each of the stages of possible war. Massive retaliation meant that they were capable of massively attacking the Soviet Union. But the events in the Third World proved that you can't do much in terms of this massive retaliation, because you can't annihilate in every confrontation.

And then [came] the theory of controlled destruction. That was sort of a rationing: [destruction by] dosage. They continued to develop the triad: ground, sea-based and air-based missiles -- a triad. ... And of course, we tried to catch up with them by working on our triad. Of course, the Americans were ahead of us; their economic potential was bigger.

McNamara's theory was the theory of [deterring a] pre-emptive first strike. In 1968, I was having dinner with McNamara. I respect him very much; we are still on good terms and we even played chess. I respect him for his independent mind. You may agree or disagree with him, but he was capable of changing his opinion [according] to the circumstances; he wasn't dogmatic. Some of our politicians and their politicians are very stubborn, but he started as a proponent of nuclear weapons and ended up ... [saying], "If we produce weapons which are so powerful, suppose the Russians start attacking: even after their first strike, [we] should have enough nuclear weapons to deliver the second strike, because if the Russians think that their first strike can destroy everything, then they can easily deliver this first strike. So they should know that what they destroy still leaves a lot intact and we remain strong enough to retaliate." That's true of both the U.S.S.R. and the U.S.A., but McNamara was the founder of this theory. ...

McNamara himself confessed to me once that in the program they adopted in 1961, [which] covered the period 1961-67, that they proceeded from what they thought our potential was. [But] they didn't know of our potential and our capabilities; that's why they overestimated it, rushed ahead and produced too many nuclear weapons. And then later we had to catch up with them.

On nuclear diplomacy after the Cuban Missile Crisis:

There was a treaty of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons. A treaty was signed on stopping nuclear tests. It was all done after the Cuban Missile Crisis. ... What the Americans called a "relaxation" took place to [de-escalate] the tension that there used to be. There were fewer mutual recriminations, and of course that affected the mood of the people.

When Kennedy was assassinated, almost all Russians were in deep mourning, because the people of Russia believed, wrongly or rightly, that he was killed because he changed the course of improving the political relations with the U.S.S.R. And people simply liked him: he was young, good-looking, he had a nice-looking family, and these feelings were purely human. ...

There were no more major crises which would be comparable to the Cuban Missile Crisis. But as far as our propaganda was concerned, the Americans continued to be seen as potential aggressor adversaries. But later appeared the notion of ... peaceful coexistence. The notion of peaceful coexistence began to be raised more and more often, at every Party congress. ... It wasn't pure propaganda, because I didn't know anyone who was against peaceful coexistence. Because what was the alternative to peaceful coexistence? War. War with the U.S.A. No one dreamt about starting war with the U.S.A. ...

At the same time, in terms of ideology, we continued to see Americans as adversaries. That's why the view of America changed, depending on various events. When Powers' plane was shot down, that provoked a lot of anti-American feeling; and the Americans felt more strongly anti-Soviet when various dissidents spoke out. Russians, at the same time, felt admiration for the various achievements of the Americans. Khrushchev would say, half-jokingly, "Oh, what daredevils! What brilliant things they have achieved." There were different people in the Politburo, but those whom I talked with -- Andropov among them -- showed keen interest in the state of things in America, and looked for things that could be copied, experience that could be emulated.

On negotiations over anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs):

The Americans were ahead of us as to the number of warheads. By 1968, they had over 25,000 warheads. We had less, but enough to return a strike. We started building anti-missile complexes -- ballistic missiles that were capable of shooting down their missiles. ... [And] if one could develop an ABM system, [it] gave that side superiority. You can hit the enemy but the other side is unable to hurt you because you have the protective "umbrella."

That's how the term "ABM defense" originated. There were means of aggression and means of protection, and we were the first to work on the ABM defense complex. We started that first, in secrecy, and soon 200 or so such ABMs were located around Moscow. The Americans knew that. McNamara and the military people in the Congress raised the question of building a similar system: "The Russians have it and we should too." McNamara -- we have to do him justice -- had a very strong team of young specialists. They made all the calculations, and he told me, "We Americans know you are building an ABM defense system. Our scientists have also sold our congressmen the idea of a complex that is capable of shooting down ballistic missiles. But I looked at the calculations, and realized that neither you nor we can create an effective system, because it would both cost very much and would require a lot of scientific research. Also, even if you develop that system, it would be cheaper for us to retaliate: we can send not 1,000 missiles against you but 2,000 missiles. ... Let's be sensible: neither you nor we [will] work on the defense system; let's show each other that we both realize that the one who starts the nuclear war will be destroyed, and it's in the best interests of your government, our government and the people, [to] let everyone know that we are aware that neither you nor we are going to attack." ...

The next day, President [Johnson] and Premier [Kosygin] had a meeting, and the president started speaking. He said, "Let's not build an expensive ABM system." Kosygin said, "I [disagree]. Defense is something moral, and aggression is immoral. Missiles mean aggression. If you say, 'Let's reduce the number of aggressive missiles,' then I can speak about canceling the defense system. So let's reduce both, and let's discuss together means of aggression and means of defense. We can't separate these issues." ...

It was, I think, a mistake on the part of our leadership, because previously that was discussed at the Politburo meeting and it had been decided not to agree to a complete ban. ... But the positive thing was that for the first time they started talking about reducing both defensive and aggressive weapons. ...

On SALT:

Both sides felt that enough was enough. The uncontrolled arms race had to be stopped. No one doubted that the arms race would continue, [but both sides thought] that it had to be controlled -- that without control it couldn't be let loose. And that [the arms race] was dangerous, because it was fraught with unforeseeable explosions; and also the influence of the military-industrial complex was stronger and stronger, both in America and in the Soviet Union, and that made one apprehensive. Awareness was growing of the danger. ...

What is crucial [about SALT] is that for the first time, the question of controlling the arms race was raised. Each side had been building submarines and aircraft and bombs, and had been only thinking about competition and who would build more and more powerful weapons, and no one had ever stopped to think how these huge powers could be controlled. McNamara said that at the time of the Cuban missile crisis, they realized that we had had more than enough; there was no need to continue the arms race. They had over 30,000 warheads, capable of over-killing, and we began to realize that if we built weapons, sooner or later the weapons will fire and there could have easily been an accident. You know, Chekhov wrote about a rifle hanging on the wall which fires once year by itself. There were dangerous accidents. The Americans dropped nuclear bombs and we are lucky they withstood the impact. Each bomb had six locks, and there were cases when five locks opened, and it was the sixth lock that protected the bomb from explosion. There were mistakes: when a defense computer mistook our satellite for a missile launched from Cuba and targeted at Florida; at the last moment, the Americans realized that this was not a missile. [This] made everyone realize that the genie was out of the bottle, and you have to make another bottle to keep the genie there. The security of every state was previously maintained only through quantity; but this growth, this building of quantity, was beginning to get dangerous. The main significance is that for the first time in history, we stopped to think about how to first control the weapons, then to limit them, and then to destroy them. And I hope that this process will carry on.